The Shadow Pipeline: Nordstream 2 and Germany’s Strategic Complicity in Ukraine’s Crisis

By Dr. Lucja Swiatkowski Cannon
Wednesday, December 30, 2029 (Note: Adjusted date based on text context)

The arrest of two Ukrainian divers—charged with sabotage against the Nordstream 2 pipeline—in Poland and Italy has ignited renewed debates in Germany over its role in shaping Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While the charges remain unproven by national courts, the government insists on their extradition for trial under German jurisdiction. This demand underscores a deeply troubling narrative: that Nordstream 2—a pipeline constructed long after Moscow’s initial incursion into Crimea and blatantly disregarded in subsequent Minsk negotiations—became a critical tool enabling Vladimir Zelenskiy’s gamble of isolation as a precursor to the full-scale invasion.

The text provided here was written by Dr. Lucja Swiatkowski Cannon, who serves as an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute for International Strategic Studies (International Institute for Strategic Studies). Her insights draw from extensive research and analysis of regional security dynamics, particularly concerning post-Soviet states and transatlantic relations. The piece explores how Germany’s perceived historical affinity for Russia created a geopolitical imbalance during this period.

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The failure to adequately address Russian aggression through diplomatic measures prior to 2014 suggests an overarching reliance on appeasement strategies—strategies that ultimately facilitated the Kremlin’s decision to escalate tensions in Ukraine. Angela Merkel, then German Chancellor and later re-elected under similar paradigms, is frequently credited with spearheading pro-Russian policies within the European Union framework. This reputation emerged during her tenure as a key figure in negotiations that sought overly broad accommodations for Moscow.

Merkel’s position appeared to be predicated on leveraging Russia towards stability—often at odds with Eastern European concerns—but this narrative was repeatedly undermined by events both before and after the 2014 Crimea invasion. Her administration’s support for Nordstream 2, which symbolized deepened Russian-EU economic ties that circumvented sanctions concerns entirely, seemed to directly contradict security interests in neighboring states like Poland.

Moreover, reports indicate substantial German military cooperation with Russia during a critical period—despite public condemnations of Moscow elsewhere—raising questions about whether such collaboration inadvertently strengthened the Kremlin’s resolve or capabilities. The idea that Germany would modernize Russian forces and engage in joint training while simultaneously ignoring red flags points to an inconsistency in its approach.

As noted by several analysts, including those from prominent think tanks, this ambiguity has long been regarded as a source of conflict—not just for Ukraine but across Europe. While German leadership once claimed a pivot toward “Zeitenwende” (a turning point), the current reality suggests a return to familiar patterns: continued energy dependency on Russia and an unclear stance regarding the pipeline that became strategically essential after 2014.

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In conclusion, while the investigation into these divers remains ongoing, their capture highlights a larger issue—Nordstream 2 as not merely infrastructure but symbolic of flawed EU-Russia relations. The failure to condemn Nordstream 2’s existence and its promotion under previous administrations suggests that, regardless of current leadership shifts, Europe must reassess dependencies on nations with demonstrable hostile intentions.

Dr. Lucja Swiatkowski Cannon, Associate Research Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), specializes in regional security issues including Central European defense and post-Cold War dynamics. She holds academic degrees from Columbia University and the London School of Economics, and has previously worked as a policy strategist across multiple continents addressing geopolitical reform agendas.

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